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I. INTRODUCTION
The new value exception1 to the Chapter 11 absolute priority rule pro-
vides a narrow avenue for equity holders to retain an equity interest in a
reorganized company over the objections of senior creditors and interest
holders. With the increasing number of Chapter 11 reorganization filings
by private equity owned companies,2 private equity firms may be inter-
ested in exploring ways to retain their equity ownership in the debtor com-
pany. This Note explores the unique implications a private equity firm
may encounter when attempting to utilize the new value exception as a
last resort to maintain ownership in a debtor company.
Part II of this Note briefly explains how the absolute priority rule func-
tions. Furthermore, this section discusses the case law development of the
new value exception. Part III then analyzes the particular challenges and
considerations a private equity firm may face when attempting to meet
each of the new value exception requirements. Ultimately, this section
demonstrates that private equity firms hold a unique position among
debtor-reorganized companies, which may aid them in obtaining new eq-
uity ownership through the new value exception. Part IV therefore con-
cludes that private equity firms may be able to take advantage of this
exception, but they must tread cautiously in light of an absence of case law
guidance and the ambiguous legislation surrounding the new value
exception.
* The author is a May 2012 graduate of the University of Michigan Law School.
The author wishes to thank Zoltan Papp, Zachary Oswald, and Amy Stein for their feedback
and support, as well as the editors and board of the Michigan Journal of Private Equity &
Venture Capital Law.
1. Note that the new value exception is sometimes also referred to as the new value
corollary. For purposes of consistency, this Note will use the term “new value exception” and
will reference plans that employ the new value exception as “new value plans.”
2. For a discussion on the increase in the number of Chapter 11 filings, see Ed Flynn
& Thomas C. Kearns, Filing Trends in Bankruptcy, 2007-11, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 12,
2011, at 72 (noting that there has been a 115.9% increase in Chapter 11 filings from 2007 to
2010).
197
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II. INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW VALUE EXCEPTION
To understand how the new value exception functions, it is first impor-
tant to understand the basic underpinnings behind the absolute priority
rule.3 When a company files for Chapter 11, the company will put forth a
plan to reorganize and continue to operate the company as the Debtor in
Possession (“DIP”).4 The DIP will work with creditors to hopefully con-
firm a plan that is acceptable to all parties involved.5 Due to the realistic
limitations of reorganizing debtors, creditors will often accept less than the
full amount they are owed.6 However, during the confirmation process of
a Chapter 11 reorganization plan, creditors have the right to object to a
proposed plan and thereby trigger the absolute priority rule.7 The Bank-
ruptcy Act requires that a creditor’s objection to a proposed plan be up-
held if the plan unfairly discriminates or is not “fair and equitable” to each
dissenting creditor class impaired by the proposed plan.8 If a proposed
plan does not allow creditors’ claims to be paid in full or if it prevents
junior interests from receiving or retaining property, then the plan will be
deemed neither fair nor equitable.9 Therefore, the absolute priority rule
generally provides that no junior creditors or interest holders may retain
any interest in an indebted company prior to payment in full of senior
creditor claims. Thus, for a proposed plan to be permissible under the ab-
solute priority rule, creditor claims must be paid off in full in order of their
priority status.10
When senior creditors are unwilling to accept less than the full amount
they are owed, however, the new value exception to the absolute priority
3. The absolute priority rule is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2011).
4. For additional explanation of the Chapter 11 process, see generally Lawrence P.
King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107, 110 (1979).
5. Id.
6. General unsecured creditors are the last in line to be paid out during bankruptcy.
See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2011). As such, they must attempt to recoup expenses and claims from
what remains leftover after higher priority creditors have already collected from the debtor.
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2011). This section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 allows
creditors to object to a proposed plan and for the plan’s proponent to then “cramdown” the
plan on the dissenting creditors. Id. As discussed below, see discussion infra Section III, to
obtain plan confirmation, the plan proponent must have at least one impaired creditor class
approve the plan, must satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
save for subsection eight, must not discriminate unfairly among the impaired creditor classes
and must be fair and equitable to all of the rejecting creditor classes. Id.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2011).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2011).
10. See Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge Ltd. P’ship, 248 B.R. 668, 678 (D. Mass.
2000) (“As to a dissenting class of impaired unsecured creditors, a plan may be found to be
‘fair and equitable’ only if the allowed value of the claim is to be paid in full, . . .
§ 1129(b)(2)(i), or in the alternative, if the claim is not paid in full, no junior class may re-
ceive any interest in the property, . . . § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).”). For further discussion on settle-
ment of creditors during Chapter 11, see John D. Ayer et al., What Every Unsecured Creditor
Should Know About Chapter 11, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 1, 2004, at 5.
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rule provides a solution11 for equity owners who want to retain full owner-
ship of a debtor company. The new value exception allows equity owners
to contribute new value into the debtor during reorganization.12 While the
new value exception is not explicitly stated in the Bankruptcy Code, it
arose out of case law in 1938, and its existence has since been highly
debated.13
The Supreme Court initially acknowledged the new value exception’s
potential existence in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.14 when it
stated in dicta that “[c]ircumstances may exist where the success of an un-
dertaking requires that new money be furnished and where the former
stockholders are the only or most feasible source of the new capital.”15
The Court thus implied that equity holders might be able to retain their
interest in the reorganized company, even when a senior creditor has not
been paid in full, if the equity holders contribute new value necessary to a
successful reorganization.16 When the Bankruptcy Act was subsequently
enacted in 1978, it made no explicit mention of the new value exception.17
Over the years, a circuit split arose18 as to whether the new value excep-
tion existed and, if so, how to determine whether a proposed plan quali-
fied for the new value exception.19
11. Beyond the new value exception, the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 also allows for an
affirmative vote by impaired creditors to approve a proposed plan to which a class of credi-
tors objects. For further explanation of the affirmative vote and why it may not always suffice
to overcome creditor objections, see Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, 3
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 125, 133-34 (1997).
12. The new value contributed must be (1) new, (2) substantial, (3) reasonably
equivalent to the interest received, (4) money or money’s worth, and (5) necessary for the
reorganization to be successful. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121-22
(1939). These requirements are more fully discussed below. See discussion infra Part III. Im-
portantly, recent case law also mandates that new value plans must not grant the prior equity
owners with the exclusive opportunity to acquire the debtor company. Bank of Am. Nat’l
Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 454 (1999).
13. For an example of some of the early split circuit decisions compare In re Walden-
green Assocs., Ltd., 150 B.R. 468, 470 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (suggesting no existence of
new value exception), with In re Bonner Mall P’ship, 2 F.3d 899, 918 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
viability of new value plans).
14. 308 U.S. 106, 106 (1939).
15. Id. at 121 n.15 (citing In re Dutch Woodcraft Shops, 14 F. Supp. 467, 471 (W.D.
Mich. 1935)).
16. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 12, at 130-32.
17. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
18. Compare In re Bonner Mall P’ship, 2 F.3d 899, 916 (9th Cir. 1993) (supporting the
use of the new value exception), with In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners, L.P., 138 F.3d
39, 43 (2nd Cir. 1998) (denying confirmation of a plan based on the use of the new value
exception), and In re Bryson Props., XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 1992).
19. In 1988, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to address the validity of the
new value exception following the enactment of the modern day Bankruptcy Act in Norwest
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203 (1988).
Ahlers involved two farmers who filed for Chapter 11 attempting to utilize the new value
exception using future labor and management expertise as the contributed new value. Id. at
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In 1999, the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to address
whether the new value exception survived the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 in
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle Street
Partnership.20 The Court noted that, while the Bankruptcy Code did not
explicitly state a new value exception, the statutory text was vague enough
to possibly allow for this exception.21 Thus, the Court neither affirmatively
confirmed nor denied the existence of the new value exception.22 Al-
though the Court suggested the new value exception survived the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1978 and imposed an additional market test requirement, it
seems that 203 N. LaSalle left open more questions than it resolved.23 In
light of the 203 N. LaSalle decision, a number of courts have operated
under the assumption that the new value exception does exist and have
continued to apply the new value exception in appropriate instances.24
197. However, the Court declined this opportunity and instead focused on the more narrow
issue involving labor and management expertise. Id. at 203. The Court ruled that the pro-
posed new value of labor and management expertise was simply not “money or money’s
worth” as meant by any potential new value exception. Id. at 204-05. While the Court did not
explicitly state whether the new value exception existed, its opinion suggested that the new
value exception implied in Case might still be valid. Id. at 205. Thus, Ahlers left open the
question of whether the new value exception survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978. For more discussion on Ahlers, see John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After
Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 965 (1989).
20. 526 U.S. 434, 434 (1999).
21. Id. at 449 (“The upshot is that this history does nothing to disparage the possibility
apparent in the statutory text, that the absolute priority rule now on the books as subsection
(b)(2)(B)(ii) may carry a new value corollary. Although there is no literal reference to ‘new
value’ in the phrase ‘on account of such junior claim,’ the phrase could arguably carry such an
implication in modifying the prohibition against receipt by junior claimants of any interest
under a plan while a senior class of unconsenting creditors goes less than fully paid.”).
22. As discussed further below, the Court did impose additional restrictions on the use
of any potential new value exception, including a market valuation test and not allowing the
old equity owner to have the exclusive opportunity to obtain equity in the reorganized
debtor. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 456, 458.
23. For more discussion about the confusion created by the decision in 203 N. LaSalle,
see Alexander F. Watson, Left for Dead?: The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the New Value
Exception in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle
Street Partnership, 78 N.C.L. REV. 1190, 1994 (2000); see also Harvey R. Miller et al., Leav-
ing Old Questions Unanswered and Raising New Ones: The Supreme Court Furthers the New
Value Controversy in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle
Street Partnership, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 553, 581 (2000).
24. See, e.g., In re Trikeenan Tileworks, Inc., Nos. 10-13725-JMD, 10-13726-JMD, 10-
13727-JMD, 2011 WL 2898955, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.H. July 14, 2011) (analyzing a new value
plan under the assumption of the new value exception’s existence); In re 68 West 127 St.,
LLC, 285 B.R. 838, 848 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that new value plans, while not out-
right endorsed in 203 N. LaSalle, still carried considerable validity and that the debtor there-
fore had the right to make the case for its plans that used the new value exception); In re
Situation Mgmt. Sys., 252 B.R. 859, 860 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (allowing a debtor to employ
a new value plan but terminating its exclusivity period). For additional discussion on cases
confirming new value plans post 203 N. LaSalle, see Georgakopoulos, supra note 12, at 137-
44. Further, the amendments imposed on Chapter 11 by the Bankruptcy Abuse Consumer
and Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) provide an exception for individual debtors under 11
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III. HOW PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS CAN MAKE USE OF THE
NEW VALUE EXCEPTION
Even in circuits that support the new value exception, confirmation of
a plan that employs the new value exception is difficult to obtain.25 There
are stringent requirements imposed on what constitutes an acceptable
form of contribution from a former equity holder wishing to qualify for the
new value exception. The contribution must be 1) “new”; 2) “substantial”;
3) “reasonably equivalent to the interest received”; 4) “money or money’s
worth”; and 5) “necessary” for the reorganization to be successful.26
Plans utilizing the new value exception are most commonly employed
in single-asset real estate cases where the mortgage debt is in excess of the
real property’s value.27 Recently, however, at least one private equity firm
has successfully employed the new value exception to obtain control of a
reorganized debtor.28 Private equity firms that hold an equity interest in a
reorganized debtor and are interested in utilizing the new value exception
may face several obstacles, as their holdings typically involve more compli-
cated facts and creditor schemes than single-asset real estate cases. Thus,
while it is possible for private equity firms to receive plan confirmation
using the new value exception, there are difficulties private equity firms
should consider.
The greatest hurdle likely to be encountered by private equity firms
seeking to file for the new value exception is the lack of guidance regard-
ing which standard should be applied for several of the exception’s re-
quirements. It seems that some of these requirements, such as the
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). BAPCPA allows individual debtors to retain property even if an
unsecured creditor class receives less than the full amount of their claims.
25. A 1996 article focused on a narrow sample of proposed new value plans suggested
that, although proposed new value plans increased from 1986 to 1996, only a small fraction of
them were actually confirmed. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 12, at 137-39.
26. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1939). Note that
Case originally only named three of these principles: that the contribution be new, reasonably
equivalent to the interest received, and necessary for the reorganization’s success. Id. How-
ever, many jurisdictions have also adopted the substantial and money or money’s worth re-
quirements as well. See, e.g., In re A & F Elec. Co., No. 07-01377, 2007 WL 5582063, at *11
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. Aug. 22, 2007) (analyzing a new value plan using all five requirements);
In re Sovereign Group 1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. 702, 708-10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (employing
all five requirements in the court’s analysis of the proposed plan).
27. See, e.g., Single Asset Proposals, NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMMISSION, available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/16sare.html (last visited April 6, 2012).
28. Kenner & Co.’s acquisition of Atrium Corp. through Chapter 11 provides a recent
example. Kenner & Co. was the existing equity holder of Atrium and partnered with a sec-
ond private equity firm, Golden Gate Private Equity, Inc., where both private equity firms
contributed $169.2 million in new equity in exchange for 92.5% of stock in Atrium’s reorga-
nized entity. For a firm release, see Kenner & Co., Inc. in its Acquisition of Atrium Corp.
through a Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan, HUGHES HUBBARD, available at http://www.
hugheshubbard.com/Representation-of-Kenner—Co-Inc-in-its-acquisition-of-Atrium-Corp-
through-a-Chapter-11-reorganization-plan (last visited April 6, 2012). The proposed plan was
confirmed by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Id.
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requirement that the contributed new value must be “new” and essentially
a present contribution paid to purchase old equity, are rather straightfor-
ward. However, as discussed below, other requirements do not have clear,
bright-line standards and therefore require more thorough analyses.
A. The Contribution Must Be Substantial
Whether a private equity firm fulfills the second requirement that the
contribution be substantial will vary based on the individual circumstances
of each case. For this requirement, bankruptcy courts typically look to two
or more of the following factors:
the size of the contribution; its relation to the amount of unsecured claims
against the estate; its relation to the plan’s distribution to unsecured creditors;
its relation to the amount of pre-petition claims; its relation to a normal mar-
ket contribution; and the amount of debt to be discharged.29
Thus, this requirement attempts to prevent new value contributions from
exceeding the value of the debt by only a nominal amount through a com-
parison of the contribution-to-debt ratio.30 In structuring the new value
amount, private equity firms must be aware of the new value’s ratio to the
unpaid debt and ensure this figure is not de minimis.31 The additional con-
siderations listed above also suggest that private equity firms should pay
close attention to the amount of the unsecured claims that will be paid
under the proposed plan.
As the contribution-to-debt ratio is not the only factor courts consider
in determining substantiality, courts may also look to whether the private
equity firm used its “best efforts” to provide a substantial amount.32 This
may be examined by inquiring into the financial records of the plan’s pro-
ponent.33 Private equity firms must therefore also be careful not to un-
derutilize their available funds as many firms have vast pools of available
funds. Cambridge Associates recently released a study stating that United
States private equity firms have $445 billion of uncommitted capital availa-
ble.34 While the amount of capital each individual firm has available var-
29. In re Haskell Dawes, Inc., 199 B.R. 867, 875 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
30. Bankruptcy courts have looked at the ratio of the proposed new value contribution
to the outstanding debt. Compare In re Sovereign Group 1985-27 Ltd., 142 Bankr 702, 710
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding contribution with 3.6% ratio was not substantial), and In re
Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding contribution with 3.8% ratio
was not substantial), and In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding contri-
bution with 2.7% ratio was not substantial), with In re Duval Manor Assocs., 191 B.R. 622,
635-36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding contribution with 4.2% ratio was substantial), and In
re Union Meeting Partners, 165 B.R. 553, 570 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding contribution
with 5.9% ratio was substantial). See also In re Haskell Dawes, Inc., 199 B.R. at 876-77 (dis-
cussing the substantiality requirement and contribution-to-unpaid debt ratios).
31. See cases cited supra note 32.
32. See In re Haskell Dawes, Inc., 199 B.R. at 875-77.
33. See id. at 877.
34. Matthew Bristow, $445 Billion Cash Available at US Private Equity Firms, J. REC.,
May 10, 2010, available at http://journalrecord.com/2010/05/10/445-billion-cash-available-at-
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ies, this staggering figure may make it difficult for private equity firms to
claim lack of access to free capital as a reason for a lower contribution
amount. If possible, private equity firms should stress the amount of un-
paid claims that have the potential to be paid under their proposed plan
compared with the less likely potential for these claims to be paid under
competing bids in the market.35 This strategy might allow private equity
firms to avoid disclosing detailed financial statements of their holdings and
capital availability by instead placing focus back on the contribution-to-
debt ratio and the ability of the private equity firm to pay off a higher
proportion of claims than other competing bidders.36
B. Equity Holders Must Meet the Reasonably Equivalent Standard
The third requirement, that the contribution be reasonably equivalent
to the interest received, aims to prevent old equity holders from receiving
something “on account of” their junior claims.37 Equity holders must not
receive an interest in a reorganized debtor “on account of” their prior
ownership interest, as this could allow them to skirt the absolute priority
rule simply “by offering token cash contributions.”38 To determine
whether the contribution is reasonably equivalent to the interest received,
the court may examine the value of the debtor after reorganization.39
However, courts are cognizant of the difficulties and uncertainties related
to valuing a corporate debtor.40 Some courts, for example, have placed the
us-private-equity-firms/. Some of the largest private equity firms reportedly had over $10
billion in uncommitted capital in 2010. This phenomena may be credited to how private eq-
uity investments are structured (typically they tie up investment money for roughly ten years
but must invest the full amount during the fund’s first three to five years and then promptly
reinvest funds once returns are received. The criticism is that there are not enough attractive
deal opportunities to sustain the number of private equity firms and investors in the market-
place, and deals are simply taking too long to occur. See Julie Creswell, On Wall Street, So
Much Cash, So Little Time, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/06/24/business/24private.html. For a good introduction on private equity funds, see gen-
erally Public Value: A Primer on Private Equity, PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, 2007, available
at http://www.pegcc.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/pec_primer_layout_final.pdf.
35. For more discussion on the market test, see infra Section III(E).
36. This idea ties in with the market test, discussed infra Section III(E). This approach
may allow private equity firms to make positive use of the market test by directly comparing
any superior ability of their plan to service debt over competing bidders and plans.
37. In re Haskell Dawes, Inc., 199 B.R. at 877.
38. In re Graphic Commc’ns, Inc., 200 B.R. 143, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996).
39. Id. (“An important factor in determining whether the new cash contribution is
reasonably equivalent to the future participation is the value of the reorganized debtor.”).
See also In re Trevarrow Lanes, Inc., 183 Bankr. 475, 489 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (discuss-
ing how, if the contribution amount is substantially less than the participation right’s market
value, this may indicate an interest is being received on account of the old equity owner’s
prior interest, unless other plausible explanations for the price discrepancy exist).
40. In re Trevarrow Lanes, Inc., 183 Bankr. at 489-90 (“The valuation of a corporate
debtor is a complex task . . . .” [quoting In re Potter Material Serv., Inc., 781 F.2d 99, 104 (7th
Cir. 1986)]); see also In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. . 1000, 1008 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991)
(noting the uncertainties of stock valuation in this context).
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corporate valuation burden on the plan proponent and have denied confir-
mation without evidence of the debtor’s post-reorganization value.41
In light of this shifted burden, private equity firms may have a special
understanding and advantage in providing corporate-debtor valuation esti-
mates. Private equity funds frequently employ valuation methods in decid-
ing whether to invest equity in a company.42 As their business rests on
reaping returns from increasing a company’s value, private equity firms
carefully examine a potential investment’s value and the ability to signifi-
cantly improve company returns.43 Therefore, private equity firms likely
already have reliable valuation strategies they can employ to meet this
requirement.
What may, however, pose a problem for private equity firms is their
choice in valuation strategies. Recent changes to accounting rules allow
for flexibility in valuing investments and can thus lead to varied results.44
Opponents to a proposed new value plan may therefore refute valuation
evidence simply based on a variation between different valuation tech-
niques or different assumptions used for valuation techniques. As the dis-
parity in valuation seems to be common among private equity firms at this
point in time,45 courts may be faced with evaluating conflicting complex
valuations provided by private equity firms and plan opponents. One solu-
tion may be to substitute or supplement valuation methods with the use of
the market test requirement imposed by 203 N. LaSalle.46
41. In re Graphic Commc’ns, Inc., 200 B.R. at 150-51 (stating that the failure to pro-
vide evidence of the reorganized debtor’s value was grounds for denial of the equity holder’s
proposed new value contribution). See also Montgomery Court Apartments of Ingham
County, Ltd, Ltd., 141 B.R. 324, 345-46 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (stating evidence must be
provided to establish that the value of future participation in the reorganized debtor is rea-
sonably equivalent to the new value contribution in order to obtain confirmation); In re
S.A.B.T.C. Townhouse Ass’n, Inc., 152 B.R. 1005, 1011 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (denying
confirmation when no evidence was produced establishing the new value contribution was
reasonably equivalent to the interest received).
42. For a discussion on the use of valuation methods employed by private equity firms,
see generally International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation Guidelines, INT’L
PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. VALUATION BD., August 2010, available at http://
www.privateequityvaluation.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/110130_International_PE_VC_
Valuation_Guidelines_Sep_2009_Update.pdf.
43. See generally Brian Gallagher, Investment Valuations in Private Equity Buyouts, in
PRIVATE EQUITY MATHEMATICS (Oliver Gottschalg ed, 2009) (discussing the role of the in-
vestment valuation process), available at http://www.twinbridgecapital.com/press/
PrivateEquityMathematics.pdf.
44. See Julie Creswell, A Portfolio’s Price, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/business/05value.html?pagewanted=all (discussing varied re-
sults based on differing valuation techniques, including how changes to accounting standards
have affected variations).
45. See id.
46. For additional discussion on the market test requirement, see infra Section III(E).
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C. The Contribution Must be Money or Money’s Worth
The fourth requirement, that the contribution of new value must be
money or money’s worth, also merits additional analysis by private equity
firms hoping to take advantage of the new value exception. The new value
contribution must be exchangeable in the marketplace for something of
value to creditors today.47 Thus, the contribution must be measurable in
today’s monetary terms and cannot be based on future earned amounts or
intangibles.48 For instance, future anticipated salary or labor and manage-
ment expertise are not considered money or money’s worth for the pur-
poses of satisfying the contributed new value requirements.49
For many private equity firms, their ability to raise capital eases the
burden of satisfying this requirement as they often have access to actual
funds. A private equity firm may, for instance, be able to use investor
funds to inject new consideration into a debtor in lieu of investing in a new
venture.50 An obstacle with this approach, however, would be convincing
investors to reinvest in a failing company in which the private equity firm
has previously placed equity without seeing positive returns. A private eq-
uity firm may potentially have more success if it already has access to a
reserve of free capital and does not need to raise additional funds. Alter-
natively, if investment money is tied up in the debtor company and other
ventures, the private equity firm might consider pairing up with one or
more private equity firms to contribute money or money’s worth through
combined efforts.51
D. The New Value Must Be Necessary to the Reorganization Effort
Finally, private equity firms should give special consideration to the
fifth requirement that the contributed new value be necessary to the reor-
ganization. The contribution must be “necessary for an effective reorgani-
zation” of the debtor and thereby increase the chances of a successful
reorganization.52 In this analysis, courts may look to the proportion of the
47. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 204 (1988).
48. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122-23 (1939) (stating that
intangibles do not satisfy the new value exception because “[t]hey reflect merely vague hopes
or possibilities”). See also In re Stegall, 85 B.R. 510, 514 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (“[T]he courts re-
quire that any contribution of new capital must be made ‘up front,’ and not in the form of
future payments.”).
49. See, e.g., Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 204 (1988). (stating that future labor, management, or
expertise have never been sufficient to qualify for the new value exception).
50. Alternatively, a private equity firm could also attempt to use credit bidding in this
type of scenario.
51. For instance, a club deal, where several private equity firms are involved in the
investment, might prove to be a useful strategy in this context. The use of club deals has
become increasingly common; in 2006, thirty percent of overall deals in the United States
were club deals. How Do Private Equity Investors Create Value?, ERNST & YOUNG, 2007, at 5
available at http://www.nvp.nl/data_files/how_do_private_equity_investors_create_value_
ernstyoung_global_report_final.pdf.
52. In re SLC Ltd. V, 137 B.R. 847, 855 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992).
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contribution that will be used toward reorganization efforts compared
with the amount used to pay off existing debt.53 In order to prove that the
contribution is necessary to the continued operation of the reorganized
company, the contribution typically may not be solely or largely used to
satisfy claims.54 What courts have found to fulfill the “necessary” require-
ment has varied, although there seems to be a general consensus that this
requirement will be “met if: (i) the contribution will be used to fund re-
pairs or improvements to the debtor’s property that are necessary to its
reorganization; or (ii) the contribution is needed to enable the debtor to
make payments due under the plan of reorganization and continue
operating.”55
This requirement may create an issue unique to private equity firms
proposing a plan that employs the new value exception: it creates the as-
sumption that these firms do not wish to use a credit bid to retain owner-
ship during the bankruptcy process.56 As a result, this may prevent a
private equity firm from writing off its own debt through use of the new
value exception. As private equity firms typically use both equity and debt
to purchase a company,57 a firm could theoretically pay off a substantial
amount of its own debt by infusing new value into the debtor company. At
least one prior court decision has stated that using new value contributions
to pay off existing debt is only permissible in instances where the creditor
provides a service integral to the reorganized company’s continued opera-
tions.58 As the debt taken on by the private equity firm is merely a form of
53. See, e.g., In re Sovereign Group 1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. 702, 708 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(discussing how a $135,000 new value contribution that only used $15,000 toward reorganiza-
tion efforts was an insignificant amount that did not facilitate reorganization efforts).
54. In re Mortgage Inv. Co. of El Paso, Tex., 111 B.R. 604, 620 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1990) (discussing how the use of the contribution to solely pay off creditors was not necessary
to continued operations of the reorganized debtor). However, when debt payment is neces-
sary for the continued operation of the reorganized company, this may provide a legitimate
basis for using a greater portion of funds toward debt repayment. See In re Sovereign Group
1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. at 708.
55. In re Haskell Dawes, Inc., 199 B.R. 867, 873 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
56. The right to put in a credit bid is located under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2011). Typically, secured lenders have the right to place a credit
bid instead of a cash bid for its collateral claim during the bankruptcy process. Id. The debt
used in a private equity firm financing will often include a senior, secured loan portion and a
junior, unsecured portion. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Pri-
vate Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 125 (2009).
57. Typically, a private equity firm will raise capital and invest this together with bor-
rowed funds. See Public Value: A Primer on Private Equity, PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, 2007,
at 9, available at http://www.pegcc.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/pec_primer_layout_
final.pdf (discussing the business goals of private equity funds).
58. In re Sovereign Group 1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. at 708 (stating that “[p]artial pay-
ment of a pre-petition debt might be necessary to the reorganization where the money is paid
to a creditor with whom the Debtor needs to continue a relationship to ensure successful
reorganization” and noting that partial payment of pre-existing debt to a creditor did not
satisfy this requirement).
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financing for the purchase of the company,59 it cannot easily be said that
paying off its own debt related to financing the purchase of the debtor is
integral to continued operations.60 Thus, private equity firms should be
wary of using the new value exception to both retain their equity owner-
ship and favorably pay off their own debt.
E. New Value Plans Must Survive a Market Test
In addition to the above five requirements, the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in 203 N. LaSalle imposes a market test on plans claiming to fall
under the new value exception. While 203 N. LaSalle stated that some
type of market test was required to obtain confirmation under the new
value exception, the Court’s decision declined to rule on which specific
type of market test would satisfy this requirement.61 What the Court did
make clear was that plans must not provide junior interest holders with the
exclusive opportunity to purchase new equity free from competition and
without market valuation.62 Subsequent cases have rejected plans where
equity holders have retained the exclusive right to obtain ownership of the
reorganized company and where the plan was not market tested through a
public auction or competing plan.63 Typically, two methods for satisfying
the market test have been proposed: 1) allowing other bidders to offer
their own competing plans (“competing plans method”) or 2) allowing
other bidders to offer competing bids under the proposed plan as is (“auc-
59. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, supra note 58, at 124-25 (discussing how
private equity firms typically finance transactions using sixty to ninety percent debt
financing).
60. If the Sovereign Group decision is followed, it may be difficult for private equity
firms to write off their own debt through the new value exception. However, there may be
room for argument that private equity firms must pay off a larger portion of the debt in order
to make the reorganization successful. Although this argument appears to be untested, the
private equity firm might be able to argue that the debt is extremely overwhelming to the
debtor company and payment of a large portion of the debt claim is necessary to increase the
likelihood of the reorganization’s success. This, however, would only be feasible if the debt
used to purchase the debtor company was owed by the debtor company itself, and not the
private equity firm.
61. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
458 (1999) (“Whether a market test would require an opportunity to offer competing plans or
would be satisfied by a right to bid for the same interest sought by old equity is a question we
do not decide here.”).
62. Id. at 456-58.
63. See, e.g., In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 48 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000)
(rejecting a plan where the largest shareholder had the exclusive right to decide the reorga-
nized company’s owner and the equity price, without any type of public auction or competing
plan to serve as a market test); In re CGE Shattuck, LLC, Nos. 99-12287-JMD, CM 99-747,
1999 WL 33457789, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.H. Dec. 20, 1999) (rejecting a plan where “one hun-
dred percent of the new value to be paid for the equity interests in the reorganized debtor is
coming from a new entity organized by a pre-petition equity holder who alone, or with its
affiliates, is contributing a majority of the new value” and stating that petitioners could
amend to provide for a competitive market test to satisfy the 203 N. LaSalle standards).
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tion method”).64 While some circuits have suggested a preference for
which market test to use, others have not done so.65 Thus, private equity
firms need to be aware of any jurisdictional market test preferences.
One of the biggest concerns a plan proponent faces under the market
test is the loss of exclusivity.66 As the use of the new value exception now
opens plans up to competing bids and parties, plan proponents must be
well aware of any anticipated competitors and offers. Private equity firms
may have a unique knowledge of any anticipated competing offers, how-
ever, as they generally have spent a vast amount of time and resources on
market research related to the prior purchase of the debtor company.67
Additionally, private equity firms also need to be aware of the limita-
tions of using stalking horse bidders, friendly bidders, or straw persons to
satisfy the market test. Courts have been relatively cautious when such
bidders have been employed to satisfy the market test and have carefully
analyzed the relationship between the plan proponent and the additional
bidder.68 As satisfaction of this rule has not been fully developed, private
equity firms may need to tread cautiously and carefully analyze the market
for any potential competing bids that may arise.69
64. For a summary of 203 N. LaSalle and the market test it imposed, see Marvin E.
Jacob & Jacqueline B. Stuart, New Value Plans Under Chapter 11, WEIL, Nov. 1999, available
at http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=4218.
65. Compare, e.g., In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 49 (Bankr. D. Del.
2000) (allowing both auctions and competing plans with no favorable distinction), with In re
Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 252 B.R. 859, 865 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (stating that a competing
plan is preferable to an auction).
66. See Hieu T. Hoang, The New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule After
In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership: What Should Bankruptcy Courts Do, and How Can
Congress Help?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 598 (2000) (“[W]henever a debtor gives up exclusiv-
ity, it potentially opens the way for a liquidation plan to be filed by a secured creditor. This
penalizes the unsecured creditors, who will receive nothing if the assets are liquidated in
cases involving undersecured creditors.” [internal quotations omitted]). For additional discus-
sion on concerns regarding the loss of exclusivity, see THOMAS J. SALERNO, 8 BANKRUPTCY
LITIGATION AND PRACTICE 135-41 (4th ed. 2008).
67. For a short discussion on the deal origination process and the importance of care-
ful deal selection, see Oliver Smiddy, The Dark Art of Deal Origination, FIN. NEWS, Aug. 6,
2006, available at http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2006-08-07/the-dark-art-of-deal-
origination; see also Differentiation in a Hyper-Competitive Market, WHARTON PRIVATE EQ-
UITY REV., available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/download/PrivateEquity
07_online.pdf.
68. See, e.g., In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000)
(rejecting a plan where all of the reorganized company’s equity was to be sold to the majority
shareholder’s daughter); but see In re Greenwood Point, LP, 445 B.R. 885, 911-13 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 2011) (allowing an equity holder’s wife to obtain new equity based on a careful
analysis of the wife’s individual credentials and contribution amount).
69. Alternatively, a private equity firm truly concerned about competing bids may be
better off foregoing use of the new value exception and employing a different strategy. For
instance, the private equity firm could use a credit bid to obtain control or could attempt to
break up the groups of unsecured creditors to obtain more votes for the approval process.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\1-1\MPE101.txt unknown Seq: 13 23-JUL-12 10:21
Spring 2012] Utilizing Chapter 11 New Value Deals 209
IV. CONCLUSION
While the existence of the new value exception has been debated over
the years, its use and acceptance is still seen throughout courtrooms across
the country. As the number of Chapter 11 filings by has increased,70 pri-
vate equity firms may begin to look at the new value exception as a means
to retain their equity interest in a reorganized company over the objec-
tions of senior creditor and interest holders. The unique considerations
that private equity firms face may actually aid in a firm’s successful use of
the new value exception. As the law surrounding the use of the new value
exception continues to develop, a careful approach to the use of the new
value exception may be the best means for private equity firms to employ
until further guidance is provided through subsequent court decisions or
from the legislature.
Ultimately, the uncertainty surrounding the use of the new value ex-
ception may encourage private equity firms to use credit bids or some
other alternative means, such as workouts with creditors, to retain their
interest in a debtor company. While the legal requirements surrounding
the use of the new value exception to the absolute priority rule provide a
helpful framework for analyzing the potential success of a new value deal,
private equity firms may want to step outside this analysis to determine
what makes the most sense for their firm as to whether or not to employ
this strategy.
For private equity firms, the use of the new value exception may only
make sense when the firm can obtain its core business goal: reaping large
returns on investments.71 In many cases, the private equity firm may sim-
ply choose to take the loss on the debtor company as it seems quite possi-
ble that both the firm and its investors may be wary of reinvesting in the
failed company. As such, valuation models may be employed not only to
analyze the potential success of obtaining confirmation under the new
value exception but also to indicate whether another round of equity in-
vestment in the debtor company makes sense over other potential invest-
ments. Private equity firms’ successful use of the new value exception,
70. Ed Flynn & Thomas C. Kearns, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that there has been a
115.9% increase in Chapter 11 filings from 2007 to 2010). See also Clair Spencer, PE Portfo-
lio Chapter 11 Filings Increase, PeHUB, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, August 19, 2009, available
at http://www.financierworldwide.com/article.php?id=4779 (noting the increase in Chapter 11
filings by private-equity-backed companies in 2009). See also Per Strömberg et al., Private
Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress, 3-4 (European Corporate Governance Insti-
tute Finance Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 331, 2012), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1787446 (discussing the higher likelihood of default by
private-equity-backed companies as compared with non-private-equity-backed companies).
71. See Sue Troy, What is Private Equity?, CBS NEWS, March 5, 2007, available at http:/
/www.cbsnews.com/8301-505125_162-51055860/what-is-private-equity/ (stating the goals of a
private equity firm). See also Public Value: A Primer on Private Equity, PRIVATE EQUITY
COUNCIL, 2007, at 7-8, available at http://www.pegcc.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
pec_primer_layout_final.pdf (discussing the business goals of private equity funds).
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therefore, may certainly be possible, but whether private equity firms will
employ the new value exception during bankruptcy more frequently than
they currently do will likely play out on a case-by-case basis.
